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Keel v. French
162 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1998)
L Facts
On July 10, 1990, Joseph Keel ("Keel") murdered his father-in-law,
John Simmons ("Simmons"). Keel shot Simmons as Simmons sat in his
pickup truck parked at the family farm. In August of 1990, Keel was found
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death.' On appeal, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that the trial court had com-
mitted prejudicial error on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction.2
Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial.3
At the guilt phase of the new trial, Keel was again found guilty of first-
degree murder. At the penalty trial, the jury recommended that Keel be
sentenced to death. Keel had previously been convicted of involuntary
manslaughter, which satisfied the statutory aggravating factor of commission
of a prior felony involving the use of violence to a person.4 Keel's subse-
quent state direct and collateral appeals were denied. Keel petitioned for
writ of habeas corpus on January 29, 1996.'
III Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the
following: (1) Keel's claim that the state violated his due process and Eighth
Amendment rights when it allowed evidence of his involuntary manslaugh-
ter conviction to be submitted as an aggravating factor was barred under
Teague v. Lane6; (2) the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to his
parole status, pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina," was proper because
Keel would have been eligible for parole; (3) North Carolina's list of statu-
1. Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. State v. Keel, 423 S.E.2d 458 (N.C. 1992).
3. See Keel, 162 F.3d at 266.
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(3) (1998).
5. Keel, 162 F.3d at 267.
6. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that new constitutional rules are not applicable to
defendants whose convictions have become final before announcement of the rule).
7. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion) (holding that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a defendant who is not eligible for parole if sentenced
to life in prison is entitled to apprize the jury of that fact when the State argues future
dangerousness as an aggravating factor).
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tory aggravating factors' was not unconstitutionally vague and over broad
as interpreted in Tuilaepa v. California9 ; and (4) Keel's trial counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective for failing to make a Batson v. Kentucky"0 claim
and for failing to introduce evidence of diminished capacity due to cocaine
and alcohol use. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition."
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
Before ruling on the merits of Keel's claims, the court first addressed
several issues that arose as a result of a 60-day time limit imposed on Keel by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, during which Keel was required to
file a Motion for Appropriate Relief. 2 Keel missed the 60-day deadline and
the federal district court barred those claims which were not filed within the
time limit. The Fourth Circuit overturned. The court held that the 60-day
deadline, which acted as a procedural default, was not regularly imposed on
criminal defendants in North Carolina. Since the deadline was not regularly
imposed, the ground for the procedural bar was not an "adequate" ground
as required by Wainwright v. Sykes 3 and its progeny." After overturning
the procedural default of several of Keel's claims, the court addressed Keel's
claims on the merits.
A. Keel's Requestfor a Simmons Instruction
Keel argued that his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment was violated when the trial court refused to instruct the
jury as to his parole status. The court did not respond to Keel's Eighth
Amendment claim and instead focused on the Fourteenth Amendment
holding of the Simmons Court. In Simmons, a plurality of the Supreme
Court ruled that due process requires that when the state argues future
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(e)(3) (1998).
9. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
10. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that in making use of peremptory challenges, aprosecu-
tor may not exercise them on the basis of a prospective juror's race, and if a prima facie case
is established that the prosecutor did use the peremptory strike on the basis of race, the
prosecutor must give an alternative race neutral reason for the exercise of the peremptory
strike).
11. Keel, 162 F.3d at 269-73. Keel's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and of a
due process violation when evidence of his involuntary manslaughter was entered as evidence
to prove an aggravating factor will not be discussed further in this article. The court's
disposition of these two claims were proper statements of the law and provide no new
guidance for capital defense lawyers in Virginia.
12. In North Carolina, a Motion for Appropriate Relief is equivalent to a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Virginia (a state habeas petition).
13. 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (holding that grounds for procedural default on a state law
issue in a state court must be independent and adequate grounds).
14. Keel, 162 F.3d at 268-69.
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dangerousness as an aggravating factor, a defendant who is not eligible for
parole is entitled to apprize the jury of that fact or have a court instruction
explaining parole ineligibility.J In the present case, the court ruled that
since Keel would have been eligible for parole, the Fourteenth Amendment
due process right to the jury instruction announced in Simmons did not
apply to Keel. 16 However, the court's ruling did not address the issue raised
by Keel, which was a claim under the Eighth Amendment that a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole has mitigating significance as a severe
and sufficient punishment in some cases.
An Eighth Amendment claim is also based on the concurring opinion
in Simmons written by Justice Souter and joined by Justice Stevens, which
arguably stands for the proposition that all parole information is admissible,
whether the defendant is parole ineligible or not.17 When the state argues
future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, Virginia capital defendants are
entitled to parole ineligibility instructions based on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rationale of Simmons. 8 The Eighth Amendment basis, however,
should also be advanced and presented to the jury. The penalty trial jury
has but two sentencing options. It is entitled to know and understand the
nature and severity of the life in prison punishment alternative.19
B. Tuilaepa and the Virginia Vileness Eligibility Factor
Keel argued that the North Carolina statutory aggravating factors2"
were unconstitutionally vague and over broad. In disposing of Keel's claim,
the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court case of Tuilaepa v. California2
for the proposition that "vagueness review of the 'eligibility and selection
factors' attendant to sentencing plans is 'quite deferential.'"22
15. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
16. Keel, 162 F.3d at 270.
17. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 173-174 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Timothy B.
Heavner, Case Note, CAP. DEF. J., Fall 1994, at 30 (analyzing Simmons v. South Carolina,
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994)).
18. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 9 (1995), cert. denied sub nom, Mickens
v. Virginia, 520 U.S. 1269 (1997), rehbg denied sub nom Mickens v. Virginia, 118 S. Ct. 331
(1997).
19. To make the case for death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant will be a danger to society in the future (the "future dangerousness"
aggravating factor) or that the murder committed by the defendant was sufficiently vile (the
.vileness" aggravating factor). See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1998). Ordinarily,
the fact that a defendant is ineligible for parole can help to show a jury that because the
defendant will never be part of society again, the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant will be a danger to society in the future.
20. Aggravating factors are also herein referred to as eligibility factors.
21. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
22. Keel, 162 F.3d at 270 (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994)). In
1999]
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While the Fourth Circuit correctly quotes from Tuilaepa, it does so in
a somewhat misleading manner. Tuilaepa held that court review of a vague-
ness challenge is to be more deferential when the factor is a "selection"
factor rather than an "eligibility" factor-that is, a court is to be more
deferential when looking at the factors (selection factors) the jury is consid-
ering in deciding the sentence for one who has already been determined to
be eligible for the death penalty by examination of other factors (eligibility
factors). Tuilaepa did not require deference where the challenge was to the
vagueness of eligibility factors requiring a yes or no response from the jury.
Under Virginia law, the aggravating factors of future dangerousness or
vileness are to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can
consider the death penalty.23 These factors are eligibility factors and Tuilae-
pa does not undermine the validity of challenges to them based on Godfrey
v. Georgia24 and its progeny.2"
Jason J. Solomon
Tuilaepa, the Court upheld a California aggravating factor that allowed the jury to consider
whether the defendant had committed a crime "which involved the use or threat of violence."
Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973. The challenged North Carolina aggravating factor permitted the
jury to consider "the use or threat of violence," and thus the court upheld the factor because
it was "legally indistinguishable" to the factor upheld in Tuilaepa.
23. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1998).
24. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (concluding that death sentence invalid because of the failure
of the state court to provide a constitutional limiting construction to the aggravating
circumstance providing for the death penalty for a murder which is "outrageous or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim" meaning "there is no way to distinguish this case, in which the death
penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not").
25. For a discussion of the continuing strength of challenges to these eligibility factors,
see Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 457 (1999) (analyzing Reid v. Com-
monwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)).
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